EXPLORING THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSFER BETWEEN PARENTS AND THEIR ADULT CHILDREN: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA by TENG ZIYANG (DING ZIYANG)
Exploring the determinants of transfers between
parents and their adult children: Evidence from
Indonesia
TENG ZIYANG
(Bsc Math and Econs(Hons), NTU)
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS




We estimate the determinants of net transfers between elderly parents and
children using the Indonesia Life Family Survey (IFLS) Data. In contrast to past
studies, we use richer data, by including all four waves of the IFLS data. We
also use a different methodology, choosing different instruments for the endogenous
variables. The transfer behaviour is further examined by stratifying data into
different sub samples, and assumption that parents’ income is exogenous is further
relaxed. Similar results as past studies such as Raut and Tran (2006) are obtained,
where parents’ and children’s income have the expected sign. However, only the
children’s income is statistically significant in net transfer behaviour. Our findings
that the children income is statistically significant in affecting the net transfers
behaviour has policy implications. This might mean that government transfers to
the adult children has the indirect effect of raising the impoverished elderly welfare
as well, since the children will transfer half of their income to their parents.
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The number of people aged 65 years and above in South-east Asian countries is
expected to increase drastically (Chomik and Piggott, 2013) by year 2050. Coupled
with the declining total fertility rate, this signals an impending change in the
traditional family structure. Families in the future are likely to have more and older
elderly with fewer working children. [Figure 1] This change in the dependency
ratio might suggest that provision to parents by their adult children might not be
sufficient in the future. Moreover, the issue of adequate provision for the elderly
is exacerbated by the lack of sufficient pension payouts for many of the rapidly
ageing South-east Asian countries (Park and Estrada, 2013) This might mean that
the net monetary transfers between elderly parents and their adult children are
likely to determine a large part of the parents’ welfare and also their semi-private
consumption. Therefore, it is important to know how much the children will give
to the parents, or how much will they reduce their net transfers in the presence of
government transfers.
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The objective of this paper is to estimate the determinants of transfer between
parents and adult children in Indonesia. In the implementation of the econometric
methodology, we first look at the net monetary transfers between parents and
children as a function of parents’ income, total children’s income and a other
control variables. We next stratify into different sub samples to check if the transfers
behaviour are different. Next,the paper relaxes the assumption that parents’ income
is exogenous and uses the parents’ education as an instrument for the parents’
income. Finally, the Hausmann specification test is conducted, under the null
hypothesis that parents’ income is exogenous.
The main empirical result is that the children income have a significant and
positive impact on net transfers between the elderly parents and their children.
An increase in a thousand rupiah of the total children’s income will result in a net
transfer of 460 rupiah to the parents after controlling for factors such as rural/urban
distinction and other factors. Parents’ income in our study is not statistically
significant in affecting the net transfer but it has the anticipated negative sign.
The IV estimates for parents’ income remain statistically insignificant. We do not
reject the null hypothesis of the Hausmann test for both households with a single
elderly parent and households with two elderly parents.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 gives a review of the
relevant literature on transfers between parents and children, Section 3 discusses
the data that we use, Section 4 describes our econometric strategy, Section 5 lists
and discusses the results, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Literature Review
There have been many theoretical explanations for transfer behaviour between
family members. Becker (1974) first proposed the one sided altruism model where
parents transfer to children because the parents are altruistic. Raut and Tran
(2005) then proposed a two sided altruism model and a loan contract exchange
model to account for transfer behaviour between parents and their adult children.
The study introduces a dynamic factor into transfers behaviour between parents
and their adult children by making different assumptions on how the agents behave.
In the two sided altruism model, both parents and children care for one another.
Parents first decide on how much to invest and transfer to their children when
young and the children then decide on how much to transfer to their parents when
their parents are old. In the loan contract model, parents decide on how much to
transfer as education investment in their children in the first period, based on how
much they are likely to receive in transfer from children when they are old.
Ham and Song (2014) further extended the study of transfer behaviour by using
the family bargaining model to allow for transfers between a married couple and
both sets of parents. In their structural model, it is assumed that both the wife and
the husband only care about their own parents but do not value transfer to their in-
law parents. They then estimated the determinants of net transfers between elderly
parents and adult children in South Korea by allowing for bargaining between the
wife and husband, bargaining between the husband and his parents and bargaining
between the wife and her parents. All three papers have the testable predictions
that parents will transfer more to their children when their income increase and
vice versa. Other theoretical literatures have proposed exchange motives (Foster
and Rosenzweig (2001), Bernheim et al. (1985)). Under the exchange motives, one
of the testable implications will be that there could be exchange of money from
parents for non-market services received from their children. Moreover, there is
also the insurance motives (Townsend, 1994) where the testable predictions are
that the direction and magnitude of transfers should only be affected by aggregate
consumption within a family. Net transfers will not affected by factors such as
parents or children income, their health status or any other socio-economic factors.
Thus none of these factors should affect transfers conditional on aggregate family
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consumption.
Notwithstanding the list of other theoretical studies on inter-vivo transfers, one
of the main questions these studies often sought to address is the magnitude of
transfer behaviours in response to changes in the parents’ and adult children’s
income. Addressing this might allow us to better understand how to help the
impoverished elderly since transfers by the government or public to the elderly
might reduce the transfers which adult children make to their elderly parents.
In discussing the magnitudes of transfer effects, we focus on studies using data
from developing countries. Ham and Song (2014) study of transfer behaviours
between elderly parents and their adult children in South Korea found that both
parents’ and children’s income are statistically significant in affecting the net transfer
behaviours. In general, a 100000 won rise in parents’ income will result in children
transferring 50000 won lesser to their parents. The results that the transfers amount
is negatively affected by the recipient’s income is also supported by Raut and Tran
(2005) and Kazianga (2006) study on Indonesia and Burkina Faso respectively.
We would like to highlight that the paper by Raut and Tran (2005) uses the
same data, Indonesia Family Life Survey data that we are using and also looks at
the two way transfers behaviour between parents and children. However, we would
claim that this paper would differ from their study since we used a richer amount
of data and the methodologies also differ from them.
Firstly, Raut and Tran (2005) uses the total number of children the parents
have to capture the variation in altruism of a child towards his parents due to his
siblings. In their paper, it is believed that a children with more siblings might
be less altruistic and transfer lesser to their parents after factoring the transfers
from his siblings to their parents. We believe this approach might be ambiguous,
since it does not reflect how well off each child is. A child might transfer more
to his parents if he has well off siblings who have not transferred much to their
parents. In our study, we seek to address this by using the average income of
the children or the total children’s income to include how well off the parents’
children are. A high average children’s income or total children’s income will imply
that the children are generally well off and we would expect this to lead to more
monetary transfers by the children to their parents. We believe using total children
4
income instead of average children income among the households might lead to
better standard error since there are more variation for each households. Moreover,
Raut and Tran (2006) only used data from year 1993. In our study, we use four
waves of the IFLS longitudinal data, from 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2007. This might
improve the power of our estimates and the accuracy of the study. Also, it is
believed that including the year’s fixed effects might enable us to understand the
transfer behaviour during different economic environments. For instance, we are
able to study transfer behaviour in times of economic hardship, where Indonesia
experience the Asian Financial crisis in year 1997.
Also, in contrast to the structural approach adopted by Ham and Song (2014)
study, our reduced form model does not consider transfers to in-laws for married
couples. This is because the IFLS data does not include transfers between in-law
parents, and lacks information on the children’s spouse characteristics. Nonetheless,
the upside of our study is that instead of only examining the transfer behaviour
between parents and married children, we examine the behaviour for adult children
in general, including unmarried children. Moreover, this study also includes transfers
from siblings, not just considering only net transfers between one child and his
parents. Also, in Ham and Song’s paper, the child’s income was present but the
parents’ income was missing and was imputed. In our study, the parents’ income is
present but the adult children’s income is missing and hence we impute the missing
adult children’s income instead. We believe these differences might mean that our
reduced form model will not estimate the coefficients as accurately as the structural
model, if it is correct.
Also, Kazianga (2006) study of two-sided transfer behaviour between parents
and children allowed the family’s income to be endogenous. Kazianga used family
assets as instruments for permanent income and rainfall as an instrument for
transitory income. Our study also allow the family income to be endogenous.
However, we use the elderly parents’ education as instruments instead. Also, unlike
other studies that consider zero transfers and employ Rosett’s model (1959) (Rosett,
1959) to deal with the large spike of zero transfers, we still employ linear regression
in our study. This is one area for improvement in future work. We present our
econometric strategy in the next section.
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3 Econometric Strategy
Our baseline specification is:
NET TFi = β0+β1Parents Inci+β2Total Child Inci+δ11997i+δ22000i+δ32007+βXi+i
where NET TFi is the Net transfer between parents and children. Parents Inc
refers to parents’ total income while Total Child Inci is the total income for all
children in the household. We cluster by each household to account for correlation
within each family.
The identifying assumption for the net transfer determinants in our OLS specification
is for net transfers to be independent of the parents’ characteristics. This identifying
assumption is adopted so that the parents’ income could be made endogenous
in later analysis. Parents income is likely to be jointly determined with the net
transfers since the elderly parents might choose how long to work based on the
amount of transfers they received from their children. Having the initial identifying
assumptions might mean that the baseline specification might suffer from omitted
variable bias by not including the parents’ characteristics. However, we would
be able to use the parents’ characteristics as instruments for the parents’ income
in later analysis where we would relax the assumptions that parents’ income is
exogenous. Moreover, we would also like to note that since we are imputing the
total children’s income due to missing data,the total children income is allowed to
be endogenous in our baseline specification.
For robustness checks of the OLS specification, we regress net transfers against
separate samples of households who have only one living elderly parent and households
who have two elderly parents. We also run separate regressions for urban and rural
households. This is done to check if the transfer behaviour might differ substantially
for single elderly parent household and on urban households. Also, to account for
the fact that differences in how well off each child is might affect the net transfers
behaviour differently, we also perform the same set of regressions with average child
income replacing the total child income variable.
However, even under the identifying assumption, parents’ income might still
be endogenous. Parents’ income might be jointly determined with the net transfer
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between their children, since the extent to which elderly parents choose to work may
depend on the transfers by their children. Moreover, the parents’ current income
might not be a true reflection of their permanent income that affects the net transfer
behaviour Altonji et al. (1996).This might result in a bias of the estimates towards
zero. Hence we relax the assumption that parents’ income is exogenous and use the
parents’ education level as instruments for parents’ income.
For households that only have one elderly parent, we let the number of years of
education received by the head of household be the instrument for parents’ income.
For households that have two elderly parents, we let the years of education received
by the head of household and years of education received by the spouse of the
head of household to be the instruments for parents’ income. Under the exclusion
restriction principle, we would require that the parents’ education to only affect the
net transfers through the parents’ income only. As with the case that all exclusion
restrictions cannot be tested, we claim that this assumption might be reasonable
to a certain extent since whatever other effects a higher education might have on
net transfers, such as better knowledge of investing in children, will most likely be
captured in having a higher income for the parents due to better education.
Under the OLS specification, we expect the signs of the parents’ income coefficient
and the total children’s income coefficient to be negative and positive respectively.
This would be in agreement with most empirical literature on intergenerational
transfers to date, where the recipient’s income will negatively affect the net transfers
behaviour.
Finally we conduct a Hausmann specification test with the null hypothesis that
parent’s income is exogenous. This is done to check if it is necessary to remove the
bias and inconsistency of the OLS estimates for the less efficient IV estimator. Two
separate Hausman tests are conducted on households with 2 elderly parents and on
households with one elderly parents only.
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4 Data
We use the IFLS (Indonesia Family Life Survey) data. The IFLS is a longitudinal
household survey that studies the fertility behaviour, infant and child outcomes,
migration and employment patterns and health and socio-economic functioning
of the population in Indonesia. The survey examines 7224 households from 13
provinces, tracked over different periods of time. This accounts for 83 % of the
population in Indonesia. We used the IFLS data that contains the years 1993, 1997,
2000 and 2007. Also, year 1993 as the base year in computing all the variables real
monetary values. Net transfers are defined as the difference in monetary transfers
received from parents and the monetary transfers parents made to children. Hence
a positive net transfers meant transfers are going net to parents, while a negative
net transfer implies the reverse.
For each separate period, we exclude households whose head or spouse are not
both above 55 years old and also for households where the elderly parents do not
have any non-residing children. We construct the parents’ total income by summing
both the elderly parent and their spouse’s labor and non-labor income together. The
labor income consist of the total income of the parents’ primary and secondary job
income while the non-labor income consists of the income from the parents’ assets.
Moreover, because the total yearly income of the adult children is important to
our analysis but is missing from the survey, we impute each of the child’s yearly
income using an earnings equation. Firstly, all individual income are deflated using
the 1993 price index. Next we drop individuals who have no income. Since we are
only interested in the adult children’s income and the elderly parent’s children are
likely to be in the middle age bracket, we only keep individuals who are between
25 to 45 years old. We next trim the data by dropping off the top and bottom 5
percentile of income. Finally, since it is likely that the male and female have their
own separate earnings equation in Indonesia, we impute each individual’s yearly
income separately with regards to their gender.
However, in the imputation of the children’s income, the years of education of
children are missing and only the children’s highest attained education is recorded.
Hence, we convert this information into years of education. Individuals who have
graduated from their highest level of education are allocated the typical number of
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years needed to complete their highest level of education. For instance, individuals
who list secondary school as their highest level of education will have 10 years of
education. (6 years for primary education and 4 years for secondary education).
For individuals who have listed only partially completing their highest level of
education, we determine their years of education by taking the typical number
of years needed to complete their next highest level of education and adding the
remaining years. For instance, individuals who only completed up till year 3 of
Secondary education will have 9 years of education. (6 years for primary education
and 3 years for the remaining secondary education.) We did this for both the
parents and the children. We would also like to highlight that imputing the income
for children allow us to treat the total children’s income as endogenous in our
baseline specification. The imputed income is shown in Table 1.
The imputed earnings is consistent with the signs of the earnings equation
from previous studies. We have both a positive marginal returns of education and
experience for both male and female adults, and a diminishing marginal returns to
experience also. The variables education, experience and experience squared are all
significant to the 1 % level. Moreover, because the IFLS 2 data for the 1997 cohort
was collected in 1996, before the Asian Financial crisis, it had one of the highest
yearly fixed effects compared to pre-crisis (1993) and post crisis period where the
economy was recovering. (2000 and 2007).
Each of the household’s non co-residing children’s income are then summed up
to obtain the total children’s yearly income variable. Since there is no information
about net transfers for co-residing children within the household, we drop the
income of co-residing children.
With the imputed relationship between the children’s education and their income,
we proceed to impute the income of non co-residing children of the elderly parents
for each household. We only impute the income of the adult children between the
ages of 25-45 years old and drop adult children outside this age bracket. Children
with incomplete data such as missing education or age are dropped off in our sample.
Moreover,in order to deal with outliers of the net transfers, we further trim the
data by dropping off the bottom and top 5 percentile of net transfers of the sample.
The summary statistics of the constructed sample is seen in Table 2. For the
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constructed sample, each of the elderly household heads received an average of 3.46
years of education and each of the elderly household spouses received 1.48 years
of education across the four cohorts. The parent income is the sum of the elderly
parents’ labour and non-labour income. Moreover, from the table, we can see that
the year 1993, 1997,2000 and 2007 consist of 14%, 31.2%, 31.2% and 23.6% of
the sample respectively. Finally for our constructed sample, the urban population
consists of 40.3% of the population while the remaining are from rural populations.
Since both urban and rural account for a large portion of the sample respectively,
it thus would be interesting to stratify the data into two different sub samples and
compare their transfer behaviours. This is done in later analysis as well.
10
5 Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the OLS regression results. The first column shows the baseline
regression without any control variables. Parents and children income have the
expected signs but only children income is statistically significant. The second
column controls for the time effects. It is observed that the 1993 time dummy has
a much larger effect than the 1997 base year dummy, we believe this might be due
to the Asian Financial Crisis that takes place during the third quarter of 1997. The
third column controls for the a dummy variable on whether there are two elderly
in the household. The effect of having two elderly in the household is not well
identified.
The forth column controls for the urban/rural fixed effects. The effect of living
in an urban area on the net transfers behaviour is also not well identified. The
subsequent fifth, sixth and seventh column controls for two out of the three different
dummy variables, mainly the time fixed effect, two elderly parents in household fixed
effect and urban fixed effect.
The main result is in the column eight of Table 3. After controlling for yearly
fixed effects, urban-rural characteristics and the two elderly parents in the household
fixed effect, we find that an increase in 1000 rupiah of the total parents’ income
will result in children transferring 508 rupiah less to their parents. Moreover, a
1000 rupiah increase in children’s income will result in children transferring 461
rupiahs net to their parents. 1 The sign and magnitude are consistent with past
studies that used IFLS data. Raut and Tran estimated that a child will transfer
half of his extra income to his parents for each child-parent pair. However, in our
study,only children’s income is statistically significant while elderly parents’ income
is not statistically significant.
1We used year 1997 as the base year.At January 1997, the exchange rate is 1
SGD to 32.10 rupiah.The information on exchange rate is obtained from the website:
http://freecurrencyrates.com/en/exchange-rate-history/SGD-INR/1997/cbr
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Table 4 uses the same specification but replaces total children income with
average children income instead. The format is completely analogous to Table
3. Considering column 8, which has all the explanatory variables of interest, the
average children income is statistically significant to the 5% level but parents’
income is not statistically significant in affecting the net transfer behaviour across
all specifications. Moreover, both variables have the expected signs across all
specifications, with parent income having a negative effect on net transfers and
children income having a positive effect on net transfers behaviour.
Table 5 shows the OLS regression of the full model estimated for urban and
rural samples separately. Upon stratifying into urban and rural sub samples, we
find that children’s income is statistically significant in only the urban sub sample.
Parents’ income remains statistically insignificant in affecting transfer behaviour.
Although this might suggests that the transfers behaviour could differ for people
living in the urban or the rural areas, we believe this might occur due to the
measurement errors of the income for the people in rural areas. Moreover, the
coefficient estimate for the children’s income in the urban sample is also rather
high and should be taken with a degree of scepticism. Finally, the coefficient year
1993 time dummy variable is very large for the urban equation.
The first and second columns of Table 6 show the full OLS regressions for the
sub-samples of households that only have a single elderly parent and households
that have two elderly parents respectively. Just like the initial OLS specification,
we are unable to get statistically significant estimates of parents’ income while
children’s income is significant at 10 %. Further work needs to be done on the
puzzling result. As noted above, parents income might be endogenous. This would
occur if the parents take transfers into account when deciding how much to work.
Hence we use parents education as an instrument for parents income and check if
we are able to obtain different results.
Table 7 shows the first stage IV regression for sub-samples of households with
one elderly parent and households with two elderly parents. Both instruments
have F statistics greater than 10, suggesting that the parent’s education is a strong
instrument for parent income. Table 8 shows the second stage IV regression.
However, parents income remains statistically insignificant in the second stage
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for both sets of regression. Although children income has the correct sign, it is
statistically insignificant with two parents. Moreover, the Hausmann test statistics
for both sets of households with one parent and household with 2 parents implies we
do not reject the null hypothesis that parent’s income is exogenous in both cases.
We believe the Hausman test is not able to get any conclusive results due to the
large standard errors for both the OLS regression and IV regression.
Taken together, our results imply that we did not find significant evidence of
crowding out from parents’ income. The estimates of the coefficient of the parents’
income has a large confidence interval and the IV estimates of the parents’ income
coefficient are not statistically significant also. Future work might need more data.
Finding that the children income is statistically significant in affecting the net
transfers behaviour has the policy implications that government transfers to the
adult children has the indirect effect of raising the impoverished elderly welfare as
well, since the children will transfer half of their income to their parents. Moreover,
getting the same positive signs of the children’s income coefficient also confirms
that net transfers can be seen as a normal good in the eyes of the adult children.
However, since the coefficient of parents income is not well identified, we are unable
to know the effect on transfer behaviour should there be a government transfer to
the elderly parents.
There are several suggested improvements and extensions to this study in the
future work. First, the inclusion of time transfers between children and parents in
the model. Next, we could use the Rosett’s model to account for the portion of zero
transfers to make our study more rigorous and our results more reliable. Finally,
given that a new wave of IFLS has just been released, one could use the additional
data in order to improve the confidence interval.
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6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to estimate the determinants of transfers between adult children
and their elderly parents using the IFLS data. Similar past studies have been
conducted in both the East and Western countries and the existence and magnitude
of the crowding out effects were mixed. We attempt to contribute to this burgeoning
and growing literature of inter-vivos transfers by adopting a different methodology.
In contrast to other structural models for estimating the determinants of transfers,
we adopt a reduced form approach. Moreover, in a breakaway from most reduced
form studies, we use a different choice of instruments for parents’ income and also
allow for both children’s income and parents’ income to be endogenous in the final
specification.
We obtain results that are in agreement with past studies in the OLS specification,
where both parents and children income have the same sign as previous studies,
but only the children income is statistically significant. We also stratify the data
into urban/rural and single/two elderly in the households sub samples to check
if the transfer behaviour differs between the sub samples. The stratification into
urban/rural sub samples shows that only the children income is statistically significant
in affecting the net transfers behaviour for the urban sample. Although this might
have suggest that the transfer behaviours of people living in urban areas differs from
people living in rural areas, we would caution that the results should be taken with a
degree of scepticism. Firstly, the coefficient of the children’s income is exceptionally
high. Moreover, it might be due to the measurement error since the income of the
people in the rural areas are poorly measured. Also, stratification into single and
double parent households give us inconclusive results.
Next, Our instrumental approach to allow the parents income to be endogenous
does not give us any additional insights. This paper has the policy implications that
the transfers by government to adult children has the indirect effects of improving
the welfare of the elderly parents since their children will transfer part of their
increased income to their parents as well. Finally, future work could extend our
study by accounting for zero transfers using the Rosett’s model, including the time
transfers into the model, or using additional waves of IFLS data to improve the
estimates of the coefficient.
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Table 1: Mincer Equation for Adult children
yearly income yearly income




experience squared -1.299∗∗∗ -1.119∗∗∗
(0.0499) (0.0761)
year 1997 178.4∗∗∗ 88.20∗∗
(28.46) (36.90)
year 2000 -4.194 -103.4∗∗∗
(26.34) (33.64)





Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
household head years of schooling 3.461 3.687 3166
household spouse years of schooling 1.488 2.809 3166
household head age 67.422 7.15 3166
household head age squared 4596.873 1004.29 3166
household spouse age 62.645 6.999 2058
household spouse age squared 2990.581 822.931 2058
household yearly labor income 421.833 652.589 3166
household yearly non labor income 194.569 629.859 3166
parent income 616.402 849.800 3166
child income 9281.947 5613.14 3166
avgerage children income 2656.887 621.775 3166
Net Transfer 2931.203 63127.973 3166
spouse in household 0.646 0.478 3166
no children 3.48 1.943 3166
children less than 25 years old 0.243 0.429 3166
children greater than 45 years old 0.249 0.432 3166
year 1993 0.141 0.348 3166
year 1997 0.312 0.463 3166
year 2000 0.311 0.463 3166
year 2007 0.236 0.424 3166

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































parent income 0.397 -1.891
(1.830) (1.214)
children income 1.013∗∗ 0.0531
(0.403) (0.156)
year 1993 18194.0∗ 7384.0∗∗
(10253.9) (2957.5)
year 2000 371.4 127.9
(487.6) (151.4)
year 2007 775.1 8422.2
(3959.0) (6892.5)





Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Single/Two Parents Stratification
Single Elderly Parent Two Elderly Parents
Net Net
Transfers Transfers
parent income -1.796 -0.183
(1.140) (1.390)




year 2000 155.9 210.1
(332.2) (191.6)







Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
There are no single elderly parents in year 1993 after the construction of the data and
the dummy variable for year 1993 is missing
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Table 7: First stage IV regression
Single Elderly Parent Two Elderly Parents
parent income parent income




year 2000 44.66 63.30
(43.40) (51.23)




household head years of schooling 52.24∗∗∗ 54.99∗∗∗
(8.184) (7.689)





F statistic 27.8225 42.293
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We would like to point out that there are no single elderly parents in year 1993
after the construction of the data and hence fixed effects for year 1993 is missing
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Table 8: IV regression
Single Elderly Parent Two Elderly Parents
Net Net
Transfers Transfers
parent income 2.089 4.761
(3.690) (4.780)




year 2000 -25.83 -238.7
(390.1) (477.4)







Hausman Statistic 0.10 1.08
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We would like to point out that there are no single elderly parents in year 1993
after the construction of the data and hence fixed effects for year 1993 is missing
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